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I. Introduction
The world has an imbalance between the nations that control global energy resources and those that utilize them. The 30 nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) plus India and China produce 76 percent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1 but only control 11 percent of the world"s proven oil and gas reserves. 2 In contrast, the 12 nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Russia control three quarters of oil and gas reserves while producing only eight percent of global GDP. This imbalance is growing as energy resource reserves within OECD nations rapidly deplete. The trend of economically powerful nations (primarily democracies) growing increasingly dependent upon energyrich nations (largely authoritarian) will define the political landscape for the foreseeable future.
Of particular interest is the relationship between Europe and Russia. In the 18 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has regained some of its former influence in global affairs. Under Vladimir Putin"s control, the nation has emerged from the chaos of the post-Soviet 1990s thanks in large part to its vast natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas. Through bilateral agreements, primarily via its two staterun quasi-monopolies of Gazprom and Transneft, Russia is the source of 33 percent of Europe"s oil imports and 40 percent of its natural gas. 3 This control of the energy supply has secured economic and political leverage for the Kremlin, particularly over the former This paper will attempt to answer this question by first demonstrating that Russia is, indeed, using control over its national oil and gas giants to corner the energy supply to Europe. A discussion of key issues will lay the groundwork for this argument by examining the current energy architecture and the relationship between the Russian ruling elite and its energy industry. Specific examples of Kremlin coercion will be cited, detailing how threats and disruptions have been used to influence dependent nations as well as Europe and the United States. This paper will then examine potential solutions to the research question in a "problem-solution" framework. There are several alternatives for countering Russian dominance of the energy market. Each will be analyzed based on several metrics:
perception of aggression (could Russia perceive this as an act of war and retaliate);
likelihood of acceptance/compliance by European allies; potential consequences; timeliness; and cost. Although there is a significant and frequently documented linkage between energy and environmental policy, this paper"s scope is limited to energy security.
II. Background
In the Soviet era, the construction of gas pipelines from the USSR to Western
Europe was considered a diplomatic achievement and "positive practical engagement" across the Iron Curtain. 4 In the 1980s, this relationship was a practical one for the Soviet Union -it was more a method of monetizing its vast supply of natural gas than an attempt to gain political influence.
This early relationship has grown into a massive dependence upon Russian energy Europe. All of these issues will be examined to ascertain whether Russian activities should be considered threatening or benign.
Pipelines and Infrastructure
A vast network of pipelines and storage facilities links the remote oil and gas fields of Siberia to the homes and power plants of Europe. This Russian-owned and operated infrastructure is also the primary conduit of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia to the West. Two maps of this network are in Appendix A.
Approximately one third of Russian oil exports are via the Druzhba ("Friendship") pipeline that transits through Belarus. There, it splits into a northern route supplying Poland and Germany and a southern route through Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Croatia. 13 In total, this pipeline delivers 1.3 million barrels per day to Germany and central Europe.
14 With gas, the dependency is more severe, primarily due to the complications of transporting natural gas. Oil is relatively easy to store and is a fungible commodity -it can be transported by pipeline, tankers, or trucks and is part of a mature global market.
Gas, however, requires a direct connection between supplier and consumer. It is very expensive to store and its most transportable form, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is costlier and Europe does not have infrastructure in place to handle the current demand. This means that gas must flow continuously to consumers and it is very difficult to build up a strategic reserve.
This is a key concept because 80 percent of the natural gas transiting between Russia and Europe currently passes through Ukraine. Therefore, any disruption within Ukraine affects most of Europe. This is cause for concern for both the Kremlin and European consumers. In its public newsletter, Gazprom calls for more diversified routes "in order to mitigate the dangers posed by political interferences in transit countries, and also, by the risk of natural catastrophes and terrorist attacks." 15 Gazprom is driving two major projects to mitigate this chokepoint. The Nord Many foreign policy and energy security experts see Gazprom"s activities as part of a strategy to increase its dominance of the gas market and stifle competition. Dr.
Cohen even goes so far as to refer to it as a "pincer pipeline attack 
A History of Disputes
On 1 January 2009, Russia sharply reduced gas supply to Ukraine in a dispute that was publicly over Ukraine"s refusal to pay higher gas prices. As tensions escalated, Russian (state-owned) media began adding accusations of Ukraine siphoning off gas intended for European customers. On 7 January, Prime Minister Putin gave the order for Ukrainian gas to be completely shut off, effectively cutting off gas delivery to much of Europe. For 13 days, more than 15 countries were affected by gas shortages in the middle of winter.
29 Ibid, 61.
Facts on the dispute are hard to come by -primarily due to the murky relationship between Gazprom, Ukranian gas company Naftohaz, and obscure intermediary RosUkrEnergo (a Gazprom subsidiary) plus the virtually complete lack of transparency of their business practices. Russia claimed theft and the right to raise prices from a subsidized rate of $179.50 per 1000 cubic meters to a price closer to the average market price, $418. 30 Ukraine claimed that this was an unfair price because they should be compensated for transiting gas from Russia to Europe.
This wasn"t the first Ukraine-Russia gas dispute. In March 2005, Gazprom made its first attempt to raise prices. Russian-Ukrainian relations were very contentious after the Orange Revolution that had removed the Russia-friendly Yanukovic government and replaced it with the Western-friendly Yushchenko government in January. The dispute escalated to the point that gas was shut of on 1 January 2006 for three days. Gazprom later threatened to shut off gas in February 2008, ostensibly over gas prices.
Concidentally, this was the same week Ukraine joined the World Trade Organization.
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In each case, prices were the overt dispute, but underlying political tensions were significant factors. Gazprom maintains that it is under no obligation to subsidize gas to
Ukraine. This is a fair business decision. However, Russia provides cheap gas to most former Soviet republics and only chose to raise Ukraine"s rates after a West-leaning government came to power. Most of these disputes have questionable motives and can be blamed on both sides (although perhaps not equally). What can be determined, however, is that Russia has used its energy leverage to achieve political objectives. However, few of the examples cited were specifically targeted against a current member of the EU or NATO 38 (Czech Republic and Latvia being the most notable exceptions) so how can these disputes with former Soviet republics be conflated into a threat to America"s NATO allies?
Threat is a function of both vulnerability and probability. On the surface, the EU"s vulnerability does not seem overwhelming -relying on Russia for 40 percent of gas imports is significant, but not potentially debilitating. However, that figure is for the EU as a whole. While some nations rely on little or no Russian natural gas, eight EU members rely on Gazprom for over 74 percent or more of their total domestic gas consumption (see Figure 1 and Figure A. 2). Two of those nations, Finland and Slovakia, are 100 percent dependent upon Russia. 39 Three other nations -France, Italy and Germany -account for more gas by volume than the rest of the EU combined.
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The threat lies in Moscow"s exploitation of these differences. Gazprom regularly extends privileged energy agreements to its closest strategic partners, such as inviting German energy companies involved in the Nord Stream project to participate in gas exploitation projects in Siberia. 41 At the same time, highly dependent nations are intimidated by Russian price wars and its history of using energy supply to achieve political gains. Therein lies the vulnerability -Moscow possesses the means to 38 The Baltic nations were not members of the EU or NATO during their conflicts in the 1990"s 39 EIA, "Country Profile: Russia." 40 Ibid. 41 Noël, "Beyond Dependence," 9. Why does that make Russia a threat when many nations depend heavily upon others for energy imports? Canada, for example, is not a threat to the United States, despite being our largest source of oil imports and accounting for 90% of our natural gas imports. 43 This dependence is magnified by the volume of US domestic oil that transits through Canadian territory via pipelines from Alaska. The biggest difference is that Canada has never displayed a penchant for exploiting this relationship to satisfy political objectives. If Ottawa had decided to dramatically raise gas prices following the election of Barack Obama or cut off oil after the Iraq invasion, American dependence upon Canadian energy would certainly be considered threatening. It is the overwhelming dependency of some European nations on Russian gas and oil combined with Moscow"s history of exploiting its energy relationships that makes it a risk.
IV. Method of Analysis
What can be done to counter this threat to the United States" European and NATO allies? A number of potential courses of action are available in two broad categories:
diversification and legislation. To compare these approaches, each will be measured by a series of metrics: risk of open conflict, potential for unintended consequences, likelihood of EU member acceptance, timeframe and cost.
Risk of open conflict is a judgment of whether or not an option could be considered too antagonistic and spark escalating hostilities with Russia. Discussing unintended consequences will be an attempt to determine how a course of action could result in a worse situation or adversely affect EU and NATO nations. Because Europe is already divided on how to interact with Russia, particularly when it comes to energy security, options must be judged on whether sufficient EU votes could be attained in support of the alternative. Some options are short-term solutions that can be enacted relatively quickly (months to years) while others are very long term (decades). While timeframe will not eliminate an option on its own, it is useful for both binning the options and can affect the price tag. Finally, the overall cost in dollars and resources must be considered. Obviously, these metrics are all inter-related -a high-cost option with potential for infuriating the Kremlin will likely also be unpopular with EU members. This paper will focus on two broad sets of possible courses of action: increasing energy diversity and taking legislative action. None of these options will be an easy cure-all and none of them can operate in a vacuum. It is a given that a blend of responses will be necessary.
V. Diversity Alternatives
Energy diversity for Europe has three aspects: diversity of transportation, diversity of provider, and diversity of source. Transport is simply a measure of how many ways energy can reach European customers. By increasing the potential avenues of receiving oil and gas, one reduces the risk of a single point of failure disrupting energy supply to multiple customers. Purchasing energy supplies from a wider variety of countries can reduce the risk of a single foreign government utilizing its exports to gain political advantage. The final dimension concerns the source of energy. A transition from a fossil fuel-based economy to nuclear and renewable sources could eventually make Europe more energy independent and improve its overall energy security.
Transportation Diversity
One aspect of European energy security that virtually all Russian and European parties can agree on (albeit for different reasons) is that gas transport must expand out of the Ukraine-Belarus corridor. The seemingly annual disputes between Kiev and Moscow over gas prices and the resulting disruptions have made it painfully obvious that it is very risky to continue transporting 80 percent of Russian imports through this chokepoint.
Russia"s solution has been to focus on forging bilateral agreements, primarily with Germany and Italy, to create new northern and southern routes that avoid Ukraine:
the Nord Stream and South Stream Pipelines. This approach will serve two purposes for the Kremlin. It will drastically limit Ukraine"s ability to both profit from transit fees (serving as a punishment for Kiev"s recent attempts to evade Russian influence) and influence Russian exports. It will also allow Gazprom to de-conflict two competing strategic goals: money will be made by directly linking Russian gas fields to Gazprom"s most profitable customers and the Kremlin will have a freer hand to influence highly dependent former Soviet satellites by permitting politically-motivated disruptions with less collateral damage.
Both of these pipelines are enormously expensive and politically complicated.
They are also medium to long-term solutions due to the length of construction and negotiation time required for trans-national pipelines. Gazprom"s Nord and South
Streams transit beneath the Baltic and Black Seas, respectively, dramatically increasing their costs, but also eliminating transit fees, which are the largest single operating expenses for the gas giant. 44 While Moscow owns a controlling interest in these two projects, they both serve the worthy goal of providing gas that avoids the troublesome Ukrainian/Belarus routes, most likely stabilizing the gas supply of richer European
nations. An unintended consequence could be giving the Kremlin more leverage over highly dependent eastern nations by limiting the "collateral damage" of cut-offs and price wars. The European Commission has endorsed the Nord Stream and does not officially oppose South Stream.
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Provider Diversity
The largest non-Gazprom pipeline project is Nabucco, which would begin in Azerbaijan, pass through Georgia and/or Armenia into Turkey, and terminate in Austria.
While access to Azeri gas supplies will be helpful, Nabucco"s success hinges on gaining For this reason and others, Moscow openly opposes Nabucco, claiming that the best route from central Asia to Europe is via Gazprom. Russia has moved to preemptively purchase all Azeri gas intended for the pipeline 48 and is developing similar arrangements with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, bringing the viability of Nabucco/TCP into question. Vladimir Putin has traveled to each nation in the Nabucco route to press for an end to the project. 49 One of these trips resulted in Gazprom acquiring a stake in the Baumgarten gas storage facility in Austria 50 -the planned distribution center for Nabucco.
If central Asian gas fields are unavailable, one politically volatile alternative is to transport Iranian gas via Nabucco. This option is vehemently opposed by the US, one of the primary proponents for the pipeline. 51 America would prefer to avoid a close energy relationship between Iran and Europe because it could undermine efforts to sanction the Khamenei regime for supporting terrorism and developing nuclear weapons.
While expensive, Nabucco is generally supported by most EU nations (Germany and Italy being notable exceptions). However, due to its political complications and lack of a concrete source of sufficient fuel, its future is in greater doubt than the Gazpromcontrolled pipeline projects.
Three new gas pipelines are being built between Europe and North African fields in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Libya. In 2008, EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs also proposed a trans-Saharan pipeline to add Nigerian gas to the Algerian hub. 52 While this could provide a welcome new source of natural gas, it would make Algeria, already
Europe"s third largest supplier and not the most stable nation, into an even more significant energy partner. Russia has also been actively engaged in this region, partnering in multiple gas projects and acquiring stakes in North African firms, so this alternative may not be very different from working directly with Gazprom.
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Source Diversity
While a comprehensive analysis of non-fossil fuel solutions is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to examine increased use of renewable and nuclear energy as a mid-to long-term alternative to Russian energy. Currently renewable energy sources (including photovoltaic solar, solar collection, biomass, wind, hydroelectric, bioethanol 51 Ibid, 137. 52 Francis Ghiles, "Europe"s Southern Escape," Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2009. 53 Smith, "Divide and Conquer," 9. and biogas) account for 8.5 percent of total EU consumption. 54 The EU"s stated goal is for renewables to comprise 20 percent of the region"s total energy mix by 2020. Ideally, greater reliance upon renewable sources would significantly increase Europe"s energy independence, but with current technology, these sources are not cost-competitive with coal, oil or gas without significant government subsidies. 55 If one or more technologies advance past the goal of becoming cheaper than coal, however, this calculus will change swiftly.
While renewable energy is warmly embraced throughout the EU, a more technologically mature solution, nuclear power, is fraught with political baggage.
Although technology has dramatically improved safety, public opinion in most EU nations (France being the notable exception) still opposes greater investment in nuclear plants. 56 In addition, most of the nuclear infrastructure in Eastern Europe was built in the Soviet era and is of questionable safety. The continued fear of nuclear technology and/or fuel being stolen for weapons programs has limited the willingness of the US, France and the U.K. to aid these nations in improving their nuclear infrastructure.
VI. Legislation Alternatives
While pipelines and diverse sources of energy all require research and infrastructure investments and tend to be longer-termed solutions, there are a number of legal and regulatory avenues that can alter the energy security balance of Eurasia. The EU can utilize its existing anti-monopoly legislation to counter some of heavy-handed tactics. With a significant regulatory overhaul, Europe could transition its gas infrastructure into a full-fledged gas market. Unfortunately, none of these are new ideas, and they all have obstacles to overcome before they can be instituted.
Enforcing Anti-trust Laws
The EU already has legislative tools in place to counter some of Gazprom and 57 Smith, "Divide and Conquer," 7. 58 Noël, "Beyond Dependence," 3.
Moscow. 59 If the political dimension could be reduced, the European Commission would be far more likely to pursue enforcement of Article 82.
Regional Gas Market Integration
The logistics of oil and natural gas are significantly different. Oil is relatively easy to transport -it can transit via pipeline, train, ship or truck and, consequently, is a highly fungible commodity traded in a mature, economically liquid market. This freedom allows both suppliers and consumers to seek out the best prices, creating the market forces that set the price for oil.
Natural gas, however, relies primarily on pressurized pipelines directly linking gas fields to customers. This results in a very illiquid market with little competition due to the primacy of bi-lateral contracts. The limitations of the infrastructure and these bilateral agreements prevent consumers from seeking lower prices from competitors and prevent suppliers from selling their resources to the highest bidder. The cost and importance of these bi-lateral contracts in Europe ensures that national governments or nationalized energy companies are heavily involved, thus adding additional layers of political complexity and costs into the equation.
If the EU can muster the political will, however, the regional gas market can be liberalized to approach the liquidity of the oil market. Two key obstacles are currently preventing this from becoming reality.
First, contracts with Gazprom prohibit gas re-sale. This prevented Poland, for example, from selling excess natural gas to Ukraine during its disputes with Russia. This is also the mechanism that allows the Kremlin to subsidize or over-charge highly 59 Phillipa Runner, "Gas war costing EU "hundreds of millions a day"," Second, the regional gas infrastructure would require additional investment.
Currently, the Russia-dominated gas pipelines flow out of Siberia into Europe.
Additional cross-connecting pipelines would need to be built within Europe to enable freer transmission of gas between nations. Building a more robust storage system would enable nations and companies to stockpile and re-sell gas in accordance with market forces. While expensive, the political and fiscal costs of this infrastructure would be far less than proposed pipelines to the Caspian and North Africa. Because legal trade frameworks are already in place, linking EU members by pipeline is far less complicated than the political acrobatics required to transit Turkey, Georgia, Iran and Azerbaijan.
Liquified natural gas would dramatically aid this market liberalization. As LNG becomes more technologically mature and, therefore, more cost-competitive, the market can come much closer to the freedom that oil enjoys -it would no longer be bound by a There could be significant unintended consequences to this approach, of course.
Those nations currently relying on Moscow"s gas subsidies would have to pay market prices for their energy. Increased liberalization could make European energy corporations more vulnerable to being acquired by Gazprom. There is also the growing concern in some circles of Russian attempts to create an international gas cartel similar to OPEC. 63 Although Europe"s second largest supplier, Norway, would be unlikely to participate, the growing bonds between Algiers, Tripoli and Moscow could bring much of Europe"s gas supply under the control of this "gas OPEC." However, Russia"s historically strained relationship with current OPEC members (who make up the majority of candidates to join a gas cartel) makes it unlikely that Moscow would be able to dominate such a global organization.
VII. Recommendations
There is not a perfect solution for ensuring energy security for our European Union and NATO allies. All of the options examined have a flaw or counterpoint to consider and all have merits. As discussed earlier, there is no point in pursuing a single option while ignoring the others, but this paper will recommend the best avenue for the European Union to pursue and the best approach that the United States can directly support.
The single most important goal is to reduce or eliminate Moscow"s ability to utilize its energy dominance to politically influence Europe or to threaten European energy supplies. The best method of accomplishing this is by integrating Europe"s natural gas markets in the near-to mid-term. By increasing the liquidity of the gas market, Russia"s relationship with Europe would no longer be based on bi-lateral agreements that allow Moscow to curry favor with some nations while threatening the supply of others. Instead, Gazprom would be able to sell the same volume of gas as before, but into a European market with the price determined by market principles. This will both secure Europe the gas it needs to prosper and reduce the Kremlin"s ability to influence European policy by exploiting the differences in member nation gas dependency. Interestingly, this arrangement could also benefit Moscow. By opening the rest of Europe to its gas, Gazprom would gain customers it cannot reach with its present infrastructure.
This market liberalization will reduce any inherent threats to new Gazprom pipelines. However, it is primarily an EU solution that the United States should support diplomatically, but cannot directly support. Also, this unified EU market might not fully incorporate non-EU NATO members, such as Turkey and Croatia, or potential NATO members such as Georgia. The greater focus for the US, therefore, should be to continue investment in Nabucco, TCP and other diversification efforts to gain access to the Caspian region in the long term. A direct link to Turkmenistan and neighboring Central
Asian nations would dramatically improve Europe"s energy security. It is also in the United States" interest to encourage economic development and improve the welfare of these Central Asian nations by providing this direct link that permits them to charge market prices to both the EU and Russia.
These two options, while far from perfect, offer the best opportunity to continue to trade with Russia as energy partners, but to do so in a unified fashion rather than as fractious individual governments. By increasing competition through greater market liquidity and a greater number of suppliers, European nations will have a stable supply of energy and dramatically improved energy security.
VIII. Conclusion
European energy supplies are not secure. While individual nations have varying levels of energy security, too many EU members, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe, rely almost completely upon Russian state-owned monopolies for their energy supply. These monopolies act at the behest of the Kremlin and political motivations often outweigh financial incentives. The Putin administration has proved time and again in Ukraine, Czech Republic, Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Georgia and others nations that it is willing and able to wield its energy dominance as a weapon of foreign policy. It is in the EU"s best interest to enact policies that can limit this Russian influence over its members.
This paper determined that the best method to limit Moscow"s leverage would be to integrate the European gas market. By moving from a system of bi-lateral agreements to a liquid market, the Kremlin would no longer be able to "play favorites" or threaten highly dependent nations. Similarly, by linking directly to suppliers in Central Asia, competition would reduce Gazprom"s ability to set prices, provide a larger variety of sources for European trade, and limit Moscow"s influence over highly dependent Eastern
European, Baltic and Central Asian nations.
Russia will remain Europe"s largest energy partner for the foreseeable future.
This in itself is not a problem. The problem lies in Moscow having the ability to use this relationship for political ends. Decoupling much of the politics from natural gas by creating a regional market and competition will dramatically increase the energy security of all of the European Union"s members.
